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Abstract 
The "engine of growth" argument holds that an economic expansion in 
a large country increases the growth of its trading partners. Growth in 
developing countries is r o u t i n e l y  linked co growth patterns in t h e  
industrial economies. This paper examines the role of  commodity markets 
i n  transmitting disturbances internationally and finds that contrary to 
the implications of the  "engine of growthn argument, a fiscal-induced 
expansion in a large commodity-importing country could e i t h e r  increase 
or decrease growth in the developing commodity-exporting country, and 
unambiguously reduces output in the second commodity-importing country. 
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I. Introduction 
After stagnating during 1980-82, U.S. economic growth rebounded 
sharply in early 1983 and the U.S. began one of the longest sustained 
economic expansions during the post-war period. Early in the recovery it 
was hoped that the U.S. performance would act as a catalyst and generate 
renewed growth abroad, particularly in developing countries that had been 
severely impacted by rising debt: servicing c o s t s  and deteriorating terms 
sf trade (see  Figure I). These expectations had their foundations i n  the 
familiar "engine of growth" argument (see for example, Lewis, 1980) that, 
in its simplest form, holds that an economic expansion in a large country, 
such as the U.S., increases the growth of its trading partners. As Table 
l illustrates, six years into the recovery these positive "spillover 
effects" have fallen short of expectations and in some instances, have 
failed to materialize altogether. 
There are many reasons why growth in a large deveroped country may 
not be positively transmitted to its developing trading partners (see 
Dornbusch, 1985, and Goldstein and Khan, 1982). Some of the factors that 
weaken the "positive linkage" include, the low share of exports in GNP in 
many developing countries, and/or the lack of complementary factors 
(infrastructure, financial markets etc.) that could translate an increase 
in export earnings to higher growth, and the higher share of agriculture 
in CDP (particularly, in low income countries) with the associated 
vulnerability of agricultural production to local or regional exogenous 
events (e.g. droughts). Similarly, inverse transmission within the 
industrial country group can be the consequence of a variety of factors 
(see Frankel, 1986a, and 1986b). A complete analysis of these channels is 
beyond the scope of this paper. However, this paper will focus on an 
important channel of transmission--the international commodity market. 
The sluggish performance o f  per capita GDP in the primary commodity 
exporters during 1983-87 may, in fact, be attributed to the unfavorable 
performance of their terms of trade (Figure I). As shown in Figure 1, the 
terms of trade of primary commodity exporters declined at an average 
annual rate of 2.8 percent during 1980-87, a much sharper deterioration 
than the 0.4 percent averaged in the 1965-79 period. Ear less clear--and 
the puzzle that is addressed in the paper--is why that commodity terms of 
trade did not respond more vigorously to the accel- eration in growth in 
the industrial countries over this period. 
Section I1 develops the "short-run" model of relative commodity price 
and the real exchange rate determination, The inclusion of cammodities, 
in addition to labor, as an input in the praduction process is similar to 
that of Findlay and Rodriguez (1977) and Obstfeld (19801, but with a key 
difference in that the small country assumption is not made. Following 
Krugman ( 1 9 8 3 ) ,  the analysis employs a three-country setting: a commodity 
supplier, which exhibits the broad characteristics of a developing eco- 
nomy, and two commodity-importing "industrial" economies. In this frame- 
work, shocks in the "home" country have repercussions abroad--both as the 
developing country as well as the other commodity importer. 
Table I .  Growth Patterns in Industrial and Developing Countries 
(Averane Annual Growth Rates) 
Primary Product Exporters 
Real GDP 
Per Capita GDP 
Industrial Countries 
Real GNP 3 . 6  0.8 3 . 3  
Total Domestic Demand 3 . 6  0.2 3 . 7  
United States 
Real GNP 3.1 -0.3 3 . 8  
T o t a l  Domes tic Demand 3 . 6  -0.5 4.7 
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook, 1988. 


In particular, we find that an increase in government spending in the 
"home" country provides the usual domestic stimulus, but by driving up 
world commodity demand in the presence of a fixed supply, "crowds-out" 
foreign demand and reduces output in t h e  second commodity-importing coun- 
try. This contrasts with the positive transmission effects of fiscal 
policy in the well-known Mundell-Fleming model (see Mundell, 1968). 
While the assumption that commodity supply is f ixed at a p o i n t  in 
time is adequate for "short-run" analysis, it is unrealistic to assume 
commodity suppliers are insensitive to the economic environment of their 
trading partners over time. The commodity market is an important channel 
in the international transmission of disturbances, as noted by Cagan 
(1980), Frankel (1986b), and Giavazzi and Gfovannini (1985). As such, it 
is appropriate to incorporate the response of the commodity supplier to 
external shocks i n  the analysis. 
In Section I11 we endogenize commodity supplies by allowing the 
commodity exporter to react to changes in the terms of trade. We find 
that output in the developing country will rise/fall if their terms of 
t rade LmproveJdeteriorate, (as in Khan and Montiel, 1987, for the small 
country c a s e )  and that the latter will be determined by their consumption 
basket. Specifically, an expansion in fiscal spending in the "home" 
country (which unambiguously raises domestic output), worsens the terms 
o f  trade of the commodity exporter and reduces their output if their 
consumption is biased in favor of the "home" good. The converse applies 
if the commodity supplier prefers the good manufactured by the second 
commodity-importing country. Further, we show that the negative asso- 
ciation between the real exchange rate of the U.S. dollar and real 
commodity prices, documented in Dornbusch (1985), is a reduced form 
relationship that varies with the underlying consumption preferences of 
the commodity exporters. 
The concluding section reviews the results  and discusses some of the 
extensions of the model. 
IT. The Short-Run Model 
This section describes a static two-factor neoclassical model. As in 
Krugman (1983), we have three countries--the "home" country, which we will 
refer to as country A ,  a second commodity-importing country, which will be 
denoted by B, and country C, the commadity supplier. Countries A and B, 
which represent industrial economies, employ two factors in the production 
process: labor which is country specific and a commodity which is inter- 
nationally traded and imported by both countries. Country C, representa- 
tive of a developing country, employs only labor in producing t t s  com- 
modity expart. This commodity will also be denoted by the  letter C. 
Following the usual assumptions underlying the neoclassical model, 
the supplies of the non-traded input, labor, are predetermined i n  a given 
period in all three countries. This has the effect of making the supply 
of commodities fixed at any point in time, an assumption that appears 
reasonable for short-run analysis. 
For simplicity, we assume t h a t  only countries A and B can have inde- 
pendent values for their  respective currencies, and that country C "pegs" 
its currency to that of country A. This allows us to consider only one 
nominal exchange rate, e ,  as the number of domestic currency units 
(country A) per one unit of foreign (country B) currency. 
We assume that the law of one price prevails in the commodity market; 
given the definition of the nominal exchange rate, this can be expressed 
as, 
where qA and tqB represent the domestic and foreign price of the commodity 
input, and e is the nominal exchange rate. 
Country A produces "good I", while country B produces "good 2". 
These two goods are imperfect substitutes so that while the law of one 
price may apply individually, relative prices vary; we can define the real 
exchange rate as the relative price of the manufactured goods of country A 
versus the manufactured goods of country 8 ,  or: 
where Pi and P2 are the respective prices of these manufactures. 
The production functions determining output (Y) in  the three 
countries are given by: 
Profit maximizing behavior under perfect  competition yie lds  t h e  
following marginal conditions: 
where the W's represent nominal wages in countries A and 8 .  Output is a 
r i s i n g  function of its input?, and the usual assumptions are also made 
that yLLJ , yCCJ < 0, and yCLJ 3 0. 
The marginal condition for country C will, of course, depend on 
whether the commodity supplier behaves as a competitor or as a monopolist. 
Both cases w i l l  be dealt  with i n  the subsequent section. For now, with 
commodity output assumed fixed, this marginal condition can be temporarily 
ignored. 
There are three equilibrium conditions in the "real" sector. 
Commodity marker equilibrium requires, 
while equilibrium in the home good market (Good 1) requires, 
where Dl is a function that represents total private demand for "good I": 
demand depends positively on the income terms and negatively on the real 
exchange rate. To keep the analysis as simple as poss ib le ,  we have 
assumed that private demands for the manufactured goods do not depend on 
the interest rate. As will be shown subsequently, this simplifying 
assumption will allow us to "dichotomize" the real and financial sub- 
sectors.  
The G's represent government demands for the same product. 
Similarly, equilibrium in rke foreign good market requires, 
where demand depends positively on the real exchange rate. 
For simplicity, we will subsequently assume that governments purchase 
only their respective home products and finance t h e i r  expenditures by a 
lump-sum tax Levied on households. Thus, we focus on the reallocative 
effects of fiscal policy B la Mersler (Metzler, 1949). 
Money demand in both industrial countries has the usual functional 
form, and money market equilibrium requires, 
In the industrial countries, the money stock is deflated by the price 
of the respective home good under the assumption that households consume 
more of the good they produce. A more general case--deflating by a price 
index that accords weights to both final goods would be somewhat more com- 
plicated without adding anything to the analysis. Country C ' s  currency 
is pegged to the "home" country currency, and the "world" interest  rate is 
taken as given. 
Asset choice is limited to the bonds of the industrial countries, but 
these are perfect substitutes so that the interest parity condition holds,  
where c fs the expected exchange rate change. Residents of each country 
can only hold their domestic currency and the internationally traded bond. 
As is characteristic of neoclassical models, the "real" and "financLalW 
sectors are fully dichotomtzed, and consequently, all real variables are 
neutral with respect t o  nominal magnitudes. 
With the labor supplies predetermined, equatians ( 3 )  and (3a) y i e l d  
expressions far C* and cB in terms of the real exchange rate and real 
commodity prices. From commodity market equilibrium (equation 4 3 ,  we can 
obtain an expression for real commodity prfces; equilibrium in the home 
goods market (equation 5) yields an expression for the real exchange rate. 
By Walras' Law the clearing of these two markets will insure that the 
third market: clears. 
With output already determined, interest rates in countries A and B 
can be expressed in terms of the respective prices and the exogenous var- 
iables. Substituting these terms i n t o  the in teres t  rate parity condition 
(equatbn 8) and, for simplicity, assuming that country A and country B 
have identical money demand functions, r ,  the expected exchange rate 
change, can be expressed in terms of the relative price of goods I and 2 ,  
the (thus-far) exogenous commodity supply, and the policy variables. 
Recalling the definitfon of the real  exchange rate, Pl/eP2 can be 
written in terms of e and R. With a reduced form expression for the real 
exchange rate already available, this substitution yields a dynamic equa- 
tion, which for the perfect foresight case, equals che actual change, 
De - r(e, C; X), (9  1 
where De - (l/e)de/dt and X is a 3x1 vector of  policy variables. The 
contents of X are: 
These are government spending in country A ,  and the money supplies in 
countries A and B. The partial derivatives are as follows: 
r0 and r1 > 0 for e and C respectively 
r2 > O for the fiscal variable in country A 
and, 
r3 < 0, r4 > 0 for the monetary variables in countries A 
and B respectively. 
Explicit forms for these partial derivatives are presented in the 
Appendix. 
With dC - 0 ,  the system can be described by a single dynamtc equation 
given by (91, not unlike the system in Mussa (1982). JJ 
1. Solving the real side of the model 
With world commodity supplies fixed, an increase in government 
spending in country A raises aggregate demand for good 1, simultaneousZy 
driving up the real exchange rate and reducing commodity costs in country 
A .  The appreciation in the real exchange rate translates into higher com- 
modity c o s t s  in country B, reducing their output. 
Since the model divides into real and nominal sub-sectors, we can 
apply the traditional apparatus of trade theory to establish the basic 
properties our more complicated framework rests upon. With commodity 
supplies fixed in the short run, the production sector ,  defined by equa- 
tions (I) through ( 4 1 ,  determines output possibilities for the goods of 
country A and B. Given the already s p e c i f i e d  assumptkons about: behavior, 
th i s  def ines  a concave production possibilities front ier ,  given by TU in 
Figure 2. 
If preferences are identical in the three consuming nations, we could 
describe the goods choice (subject to the usual qualifications) by world 
social indifference schedules. For i rnplici ty,  utiliry is assumed to be 
homothetic so that a l l  the potential indifference schedules may be 
written as radial expansions of one, say the HH' curve in the figure. 
For the closed world economy, the tangency of an indifference sched- 
ule with the transformation curve defines an in ter ior  solution (point E ) .  
This defines the production point and the terms of trade. However, 
governments in tervene  In the  world marker, In th i s  simple model, we 
assume that the government of  country A purchases G ~ *  of the heme good per 
period financed by taxes. (We assume that in country B and counrry C 
government spending is zero.) 
2/ Also see Stockman and ObstFeld ( 1 9 8 3 ) .  
The spending in country A uniformly withdraws G1A units of che home 
good from the market--seen as the private transformation schedule RS in 
the figure (see, f o r  instance, Meada, 1950, for a detailed derivation). 
The private consumption point shifts to F, reflecting both an income- 
reducing effect of higher taxes and a substitution effect of a higher 
relatlve price of the good of country A. Comparing these points, we 
observe that after an increase in government spending in country A: (a) 
the terms of trade shift toward country A; (b) production in country A 
rises; and, ( c )  production in country B falls. This effect follows a 
Metzlerian channel: taxation redistributes income t o  an economic agent-- 
the government--that consumes relatively more of the home good (Metzler, 
1949). 
2. Mone tarv dvnamics 
In financial markets, t h e  nominal exchange rate will move to ensure 
that interest parity holds at all times. Consequently, an increase i n  
government spending in  country A will require an immediate nominal 
exchange rate appreciation, This is illustrated in Figure 3 for both 
anticipated and unanticipated changes in government spending. 
As depicted, an unanticipated increase in G~~ at time tl leads to an 
instantaneous adjustment as the exchange rate appreciates from eo to el, 
This follows because the single dynamic equation has one positive root; 
initial conditions must be chosen so that the system stays at rest at the 
steady state. An announcement of the policy change at time tO leads to 
more complicated dynamics. Long-run stability requires that e decline at 
t h e  to and continues to appreciate, as indicated by the dashed line, 
until the new policy takes effect at tl. However, it is unrealistic to 
assume that such "shocks" to the industrial countries will not be t r ans -  
mitted to the commodity supplier v i a  their effects on relative prices. 
For this reason, more adequate supply dynamics are incorporated in the 
analysis in the following section. 
The static assumption of an unchanging supply of world commodities is 
quite restrictive. In particular, it appears unreasonable to assume that 
the long-run supply  of labor services i n  the commodity-producing country, 
and hence productive capacity, is completely insensitive to economic 
developments. If we return to the framework of Figure 2, it is unreal-  
istic to assume that the world transformation frontier is invariant to 
country C ' s  consumption possibilities. A shift in relative prices, for 
Lnstance, may call forth a change in the quantity of commodities supplied 
to the world market over time. 




We assume that the "steady-state" supply o f  labor in the commodity 
producing nation i s  given by, 
where the labor supply responds positively to changes in the real wage. 
The 'consumer price index" in country C ,  is a geometric price index of 
the form, 
where and (1-o), the weights attached to the prices of goads 1 and 2 in 
the index, represent the share of each good in  country C" consumption 
basket. Since both of the goods consumed i n  the commodity exporting 
country are imported, there are no real priors  t o  suggest that consumption 
be b iased  in favor of one good or the other. 
We can rewrite (10) as, 
whtch is a p o s i t i v e  function of its arguments. 
With (10a) illustraein the long-run labor supply of the commodity 
producing country, and Wc/qf j  representing marginal costs, a "steady- state" 
level of  commodity output can be calculated for  both the competitive case 
and the monopolist case .  Suppose that commodity output gravitates toward 
its steady-state value according to, 
where a represents the speed of adjustment, DC = (l/C)dC/dt, and C* 
represents the "steady-state" level  sf the commodity. This partial 
adjustment scheme--assumed here rather than derived--is, under certain 
conditions, consistent with the optimal solution o f  a planner facing 
quadratic adjustment costs  (Lucas, 1 9 6 7 ) .  
The adjustment scheme provides the second dynamic equation o f  the 
system and j o i n t l y  w i t h  ( 9 )  determines the course of all the endogenous 
variables of the system. Equation (ll), after making the substitution for 
the "appropriate" C* becomes, 
DC - @ ( e ,  C; X). 
The partial  derivatives are as follows: 
@o - 0 ,  < 0 for e and C respectively. 
These elasticities follow from the specification of adjustment costs, 
and are invariant to whether the "steady state" is the result of perfect 
competition or manopolistic practices. The partial derivatives that cor- 
respond to the policy variables are 43 = Gq - 0; changes in sign and 
magnitude in accordance with the supply practises and consumption prefer- 
ences of country C. As a consequence, the assessment of the fiscal policy 
multipliers will be dealt with in detail in the subsequent sections. 
The dynamics sf the system linearized around the steady state values 
of e and C can be smarized by: 
where 0 is a 2x2 matrix of partial derivatives and B* is a 2x3 matrix of 
the partials corresponding to the exogenous variables in the 3x2 matrix 
denoted by X*. (See Appendix). 
The existence of a unique non-explosive solution requires that the 
system have one positive and one negative root; this can be determined by 
ascertaining the sign of the determinant of 8. If the determinant is 
negative, then the system has one positive and one negative characteristic 
root . 
Assessing the existence sf saddlepath stability is straightforward 
since it only requires that r ~ Q l  < 0 in this set of dynamic equations. 
Given that r0 - -l/li and 91 - - a all that is required is that the 
interest elasticity of money demand, 11, (which is common to countries A 
and B) be negative and that the speed of adjustment, a, of the actual to 
steady-state conunodity stocks be positive, In summary, it requires that 
the parameters of the system make "economic sense" which, following Mussa 
(1984), are the only eases considered here. 
Figure 4 depicts the phase diagrams for-the system under the assump- 
tion that X* is constant at same level, say X*. The vertical line gives 
the combinations of C and e that make DC - 0, while the downward sloped 
schedule is the locus of e and C that make De - 0. We show below that the 
position and the extent  to which these schedules shift after a shock de- 
pend on two aspects of commodity exporters' behavior: (1) whether sup- 
pliers act competitively or rnonopolisrically and (2) the consumption 
patterns of commodity suppliers, In all cases, however, these schedules 
will retain the slopes depicted in Figure 4. 
If the commodity exporter behaves as a competitor, then the relevant 
marginal condition would be given by: 
3 
CF 
.- 
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C A From the Labor supply function we can obtaln an expression for W /q 
in terms of the real  exchange rate and real domestic commodity prices. 
Because labor market equilibrium requires that this expression equal (131, 
we can then proceed to solve for the "steady-state" employment level in 
the commodity-exporting country. From (la) the steady-state level of 
commodities, C*, can be calculated. This will be the C* that appears in 
(12), closing the system. 
Alternatively, for the case of the monopolist commodity producer 
facing world demand, profit maximization requires that marginal revenue 
be equal to marginal c o s t ;  this translates in to ,  
The labor supply function can be solved for the real wage, w'/~*, in 
terms of R and qA/~l. The production function yie lds  an expression f o r  
employment, L', in terms of G, and with reduced forms available for the 
real exchange rate and commodity prices, equation (14) will yield a re- 
duced form expression for C*, the steady-state stock of comntodities. As 
before, substituting the derived expression for C* into (12) closes the 
system. 
Given this system, we can proceed to analyze the effects of a fiscal 
expansion in country A .  Consider a "shock" to this system via an 
increase in government spending. As before, this policy change produces a 
simultaneous appreciation in the real exchange rate and a decline in q A / ~ I  
on impact. The rise in R will tend to increase the amount of labor 
supplied at the "steady-state" in country C, while the reduction in  
commodity prices will tend to  diminish it. 
The outcome depends on the consumption basket of the commodity 
exporter. ff country C consumes more of "good 1" than of "good 2",  
[ u  > 1/21, then the terms of trade deteriorate and t h e  steady-state level  
of employment in country C and commodity output will fall below the 
current level. If consumers in the commodity-exporting nation consume 
goods 1 and 2 in equal proportions, then the steady-state output of com- 
modities will be approximately unchanged. If more of "good 2" is consumed 
then, the commodity exporter will experience an improvement in the terms 
of trade and commodity output will be higher.  
The welfare implications for  the commodity importers also  depend on 
the consumption preferences of the commodity exporter. Income in country 
A rises unambiguously as a result of the increase in domestic fiscal ex- 
penditure. However, in the case where country C consumes more of "good 
I " ,  the long-run policy multiplier will be smaller than the "short-run" 
multiplier that holds the commodity supply constant, while the opposite is 
true for a < 1/2. Under all of these scenarios output in country B f a l l s  
unambiguously, but the magnitude of the decline will vary w i t h  a. 
In the case where both goods are consumed in equal proportions by 
country C, given that the new steady s ta te  commodity stock w i l l ,  at most, 
only marginally differ from the initial level, the implications for the 
real exchange rate ,  real commodity prices and output in countries A and B 
ate not appreciably different from the "short-runw case that holds supply 
fixed. Table 2 summarizes these results. 
Figure 5 depicts an increase in government spending for the case 
where the commodity exporter consumes more of "good 2'' than "good 1". 
Under such an assumption, as previously discussed, the terms of trade 
improve and the employment level and output o f  the commodity producer rise 
and shift the DC-O schedule to the right. This would be the case consis- 
tent with the "engine o f  growth" argument. At the same time, interest 
rates rise in country A by less than abroad and produce a downward shift 
in the De-0 schedule. 
This may seem counterintuitive i f  one considers that output rises i n  
country A and f a l l s  in  country B .  However, to understand why the interest 
rate spread ( i A - i B )  narrows, it is  necessary to determine what happens to 
relative prices, P1/PzI as well as  relative output, yA/'YB. Relative 
prices fall on impact, in  f a c t ,  they overshoot their steady s t a t e  value. 
In addition, as Table 2 illustrates, in the case where commodity supplies 
rise over time, YA undershoots while YE overshoots. So that on impact, 
Y f l g  changes by less than in the steady state. The "price effect" dom- 
inates so that real balances in country A ,  FfA/pl, f a l l  by less than real 
balances in country B , M ~ / P ~ .  Because of  the change in relative prices, 
country A can "accommodatew its rise in money demand with a smaller rise  
in the interest rate than country B ;  this translates tnto a declLne i n  the 
interest rate spread, (iA- iB) , which requires a continued appreciation in 
the nominal exchange rate, e, in order to induce domestic agents to hold 
their lower yielding assets. No exchange rate overshooting occurs. 
Figure 6 i l l u s t r a t e s  the case where country C's consumption fs biased 
in favor of good 1. In th i s  scenario, it is the decline in q A / ~ l  that 
dominates the commodity supply response, and the new steady s t a t e  stock 
of the commodity will be lower, at DC' - 0. Thus the transmission is 
contrary t o  what the engine of growth would suggest. As before, the 
De - 0 schedule shifts down to De' = 0 and the new steady state w i l l  be 
assoefated w i t h  e l  (an appreciation). Note however that the adjustment 
path to  th is  lower leve l  of e is distinctly different from the previous 
case. Both nominal and real exchange rates overshoot i n  t h i s  case. 
As i n  the ptevlous case, output i n  country A rises, output in country 
B falls, and Pl /P2 f a l l s ,  in this instance undershooting its long-run 
Table 2 .  Fiscal Policy Multipliers Under Alternative Scenarios 
"Short-Runn "Long Run" 
Fixed Commodity Supply Variable Commodity Supply 
The letters  stand for t h e  appropriate multiplier. All the terms are 
positive except those with a minus sign and the subscripts denote s i z e  
in ascending order (a1 < a2 < a3 and dl < d2 < 63). See Figure 2 for a 
graphical illustration. 
A B level. But in this case, Y /Y changes the most  on impact, as Y* "over- 
shoots" while yB undershoots its steady state level. This "income effect" 
swamps the "price effect" and the interest rate spread widens, inducing 
the exchange rate to overshoot. 
For the case where the comodfty supplier behaves as a monopolist, 
the long-run impact of fiscal policy w i l l  depend crucially on the con- 
sumption preferences of the cormnodity supp l i er ,  as i n  the competitive 
case. An increase in government spending, for the case where country C 
consumes more of good 2 ,  will follow the outcome illustrated in Figure 5 
and so on. 
There is, not surprisingly, a different set of long-run policy 
multipliers than those associated with the perfect competition case. An 
increase in government spending in  country A ,  for a < 1/2, w i l l  produce a 
smaller expansion in the steady state level of commodity output than the 
response warranted by a competitive supplier, while the output contraction 
for the opposite case will be greater. As a consequence, real commodity 
prices w i l l  be higher and the aggregate output of the commodity importing 
countries w i l l  be lover than in the competitive case. 
It is interesting to observe, that during the period fn which the 
dollar appreciated and commodity prices f e l l  sharply (in dollar terms) 
primary commodity exporters were importing substantially more goods from 
the U.S. than from any other country, as Tables 3 and 4 highlight.  
Almost 30 percent of the imports of this group came from the U.S. 
over the 1980-84 period. Further, of the 64 developing primary commodity 
exporters, 23 countries listed the U . S .  as its single largest tradlng 
partner; and for those 23 countries, the U.S. was the source for 60 per- 
cent of their total imports. Thus, the case i n  which o > l J 2  is more 
than a theoretical curiosum. 
The deterioration in the terms of trade of these commodity exporters 
first shown in  Figure 1 and the anem5c performance of their per capita GNP 
seen in Table 1 are fully consistent with the model presented i n  this 
paper; however, the model only applies to developing countries that are 
commodity exporters, For example, our framework follows Dornbuseh (1985) 
and exhibits are inverse association between the real exchange rate of 
the dollar vis-a-vis its major trading partners and the terms of trade of 
developing countries, Table 5 presents the correlations among two mea- 
sures of the U . S .  dollar's exchange value end the terms of trade for two 
groups of developing countries. As seen in the first two columns of the 
table,  only the commodity exporting group--the subject of this paper-- 
exhibits a significant negative correlation between their terms of trade 
and both measures of the value of the d a l l a r .  




Table 3 ,  Import Patterns of the Developing Primary 
Exporting Countries 1980-84 
(Percent ) 
Country Share in Tota l  Imports from 
Industrialized Countries 
United States 
Japan 
Germany 
France 
Other Indust r ia l  
Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics. 
Table 4. The Largest Trading Partners of Develophg 
Primary Commodity Exporters 
(1980-84) 
U. S . Japan Germany France Other Tota l*  
Industrial 
Number of Countries 
f o r  Which the Major 
Trading Partner is; 23 7 0 
Percent of Total 
Imports accounted 
for by Sub-group 6 0 . 4  20.1 0 9 . 5  10 100 
Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics. 
* Excludes Bhutan, Botswana, Comoros, Cote d' Ivoire, Sao Tome and 
Principe, S t .  K i t t s  and Nevis, and Swaziland for which comparable data 
was not recorded. 
Table 5. Correlation Among the Real Exchange Rate of the U.S.Do1lar 
and Developing Countries Terms of Trade 
(1975-87) 
Real Value of 
U . S .  Dollar 
Developing 
Commodity 
Exporters 
Developing 
Manufacturing 
Exporters 
Wholesale prices -0.503 -0.197 
Value Added 
Deflator 
-- 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics. 
IV. m q  
The framework presented in the previous sections is similar to that 
employed by Findlay (1980) and Krugman (1983). However, unlike the model 
of Ffndlay, it includes a second commodity importing country, so that the 
transmission of shocks to the "homew country can be analyzed not only for 
the commodity supplier, but for the other trading partners as well. A key 
difference from the Krugman model, which employs a three-country setting, 
is that conunodity supply dynamics are endogenized and explicitly modeled 
for both competitive and monopolist commodity suppliers. 
The "short-runn expansionary impact of a rise in government spending 
in the home country and the neutrality of money in a neoclassical frarne- 
work are standard results. Of more interest are: (a) the foreign reper- 
cussions of domestic f iscal  policy, and (b) how those "foreign" variables 
will alter fiscal policy effectiveness in the "long-run". 
In particular, what the previous analysis illustrates is one of the 
many channels that can qualify the "engine af growth "argument. An 
economic expansion in a large country, such as the U.S., may not be s u f f i -  
cient for inducing growth in the developing primary-commodity exporting 
countries. And if the policies pursued in the industrial country result 
in a worsening in the terms of trade for the commodity exporter (illus- 
trated by the case where the commodity exporter consumes more of the good 
that has had the relative price increase) the transmission effect will be 
negative. This suggests that the co-variation in output can be either 
positive or negative, leaving the question, in effect, as an empirical 
one. 
It is interesting to note that even in the country where the policy 
change takes place, the effectiveness of fiscal policy in stimulating 
output over time will depend crucially on the behavior of the commodity 
supplier. In this framework, the formation of a cartel of commodity 
producers would curtail the ability of fiscal policy to affect output in 
the industrial countries. 
The variety of exchange rate responses implied by the model is also 
of interest. As is typical in a flexible price model, monetary policy 
produces an instantaneous adjustment to the new steady state exchange 
rate, while exchange rate overshooting becomes a fiscal phenomenon. How- 
ever, even for fiscal policy the overshooting result is not uniform and 
will depend on whether the new steady-state commodity stock is lower or 
higher than the previous one. 
In general, the model highlights the importance of the commodity 
market in transmitting shocks internationally and shows how policy effect- 
iveness depends on the economic characteristics of both industrial and 
developing country trading partners alike. However, understanding the 
association between activity in the industrial and developing countries 
require an understanding of the developing countries economic structure. 
We have sham how simple--and realistic--alterations in supply behavior 
and consumption preferences can reverse the traditional locomotive effect  
- 20 - APPENDIX 
The partial  derivatives of the first dynamic equation of the system 
(equation 9)  are given by; 
where. 
The pa r t i a l  derivatives for the second dynamic equation (equation 1 2 )  
are ; 
APPENDIX 
For the competitive solution: 
where, 
$2 < 0 f o r  o > 1/2 
@2 > 0 for o < 1/2 
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